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Abstract
This paper develops a new perspective on the relation of instantia-
tion. This new perspective is based on recent research in cognitive 
psychology, or, more specifically, on the theory of frames, which 
was defined by Lawrence Barsalou to capture the common features 
of contemporary models of human concepts. I show how this new 
perspective may be applied to coordinate two rudimentary mental 
operations: categorization and conceptualization.
Introduction
Instantiation is one of the most ubiquitous relations in any branch of 
science and engineering. The numeral “5” is a prime number; Mars is 
a planet; Urdu is an Indo-Iranian language. All such statements, either 
implicitly or explicitly, represent the fact that a certain particular entity 
exemplifies or instantiates another abstract entity—be it a class, concept, 
or category. Library and information science is no exception to this rule, 
as attested by Smiraglia (2005) and his subsequent papers. In particular, 
the process of assigning entities to classes in a classification system is a 
clear-cut example of its application. 
 In philosophy and formal sciences, the standard perspective on instan-
tiation originates in the Tarskian paradigm of model theory. Within this 
framework, the interpretation of the sentence “Urdu is an Indo-Iranian 
language” resorts to the relation of set membership between the object 
interpreted by the term Urdu and the set defined by the predicate “is an 
Indo-Iranian language.” Roughly speaking, the standard perspective on 
instantiation likens this notion to the relation of set membership.
 This paper attempts to outline a new, alternative view on instantiation. 
The basis for this attempt is established by recent research in cognitive 
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psychology where the standard perspective faces serious objections that 
stem from both categorization experiments and theoretical consider-
ations of a more philosophical nature. Although these objections do not 
explicitly supplant the standard perspective, they open a new theoretical 
possibility. Namely, I will employ the idea of the frame, which was devel-
oped by Barsalou to capture the structure of human concepts. Within this 
new perspective, the relation of set membership, which is ubiquitously used 
to represent the relation of instantiation, is substituted with a relation be-
tween a particular entity and a frame, or a set of frames, that represents a 
concept under which this particular falls. I show how this new perspective 
can be applied in library and information science (LIS) to bridge the gap 
between classification and categorization, whose presence was identified 
and described in detail by Jacob (2004). 
The “Received” View on Instantiation
Each time a particular entity exhibits a certain characteristic due to an 
abstract class or concept, I will speak, for lack of a better term, about the 
relation of instantiation. For example, Mars instantiates the class of plan-
ets, Urdu instantiates the concepts of Indo-Iranian languages, and so on. 
For the sake of simplicity, I will not distinguish here among classes, con-
cepts, and categories provided that they occur in the context of instantia-
tion.1 The relation is assumed to relate singular objects with abstract or 
universal entities without any prejudice on the ontological status thereof. 
In other words, I intend to remain neutral on the so-called problem of 
universals (Rodriguez-Pereyra, 2000). 
 Since such basic cognitive operations as classification and categoriza-
tion occur in any branch of science, the presence of this relation is ubiq-
uitous. Needless to say, there is hardly any evidence that instantiation is 
interpreted consistently across scientific disciplines. On the other hand, if 
an epistemic context at stake involves any kind of generalization, the us-
age of instantiation seems to be inevitable. 
 In philosophy the “received” perspective on instantiation may be 
traced back to standard semantics for first-order logic, which has its roots 
in the seminal work of Tarski (1933/1983). The bit of information about 
Mars being a planet may be rendered in first-order logic by means of the 
sentence “Planet(Mars),” where Mars is an individual name and Planet is a 
(unary) predicate. This sentence is evaluated as true or false with respect 
to a formal structure called a model (of a given language). Within this 
structure, the name Mars is interpreted as a single element (of a given 
universe of discourse), and the predicate Planet is interpreted as a set of 
elements (of the same universe). Then, loosely and informally speaking, 
the sentence “Mars is a planet” is true if and only if the element inter-
preted as Mars is a member of the set interpreted as Planet: “Planet(Mars) 
if Mars ∈Planet.”
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 Obviously, if one simply identifies instantiation with set membership, 
one should be ready to face numerous objections, mainly of a philosophi-
cal nature, to the claim that categories are nothing more than sets, which 
follows from such identification. Since sets are extensional—that is, two sets 
are different only if they have different members—and categories appear 
to be intensional, an argument for the sake of the latter claim requires 
some sophisticated conceptual machinery; for example, the so-called Cal-
ifornian semantics (Oliver, 1996, p. 16).
 Nevertheless, the standard semantics for first-order logic implies a per-
spective on instantiation, which on the one hand is ontologically less de-
manding than the identification thesis, and on the other seems to be a 
default assumption in most current philosophical debates on the relation 
between the particular and the abstract. This perspective may be summa-
rized by the following claims:
•	 For	each	object	and	each	category,	the	object	is	either	an	instance	of	
the category or is not—without any in-between cases.
•	 Each	instance	of	a	category	is	always	an	instance	of	the	category	in	the	
same sense and to the same degree. A similar remark can be made for 
nonmembers. In other words, instantiation does not come in degrees.
•	 One	category	may	be	more	or	less	general	than	another.	If	this	is	the	
case, and only in this case, every instance of a less general category is an 
instance of the more general one.
The conjunction of these claims is dubbed here as the “received” view on 
instantiation. 
  Now, whether this view on instantiation is as equally ubiquitous as is the 
relation itself should be the topic of separate research. There are certain 
branches of science and engineering where, due to the impact of formal 
logic, this perspective is taken for granted, either explicitly or implicitly. 
The so-called good old-fashioned artificial intelligence approach to hu-
man knowledge is a primary example (Anderson, 2003). In particular, 
the technologies developed within the semantic web movement implicitly 
assimilate this perspective when they promote such formal languages as 
RDF(S) and OWL (Allemang & Hendler, 2008).2 
 A less obvious environment for the received view on instantiation is 
psychology, where this perspective became the basis for what is now called 
the classical theory of concepts. This theory was the basis for empirical re-
search in psychology until the mid-1970s. Its main claims can be summa-
rized as follows:
•	 For	each	concept,	there	exists	a	definition	that	provides	a	set	of	neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for being an instance of this concept.
•	 For	each	object	and	each	category,	the	object	is	either	an	instance	of	
the category or is not, without any in-between cases.
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•	 Each	instance	of	a	category	is	always	an	instance	of	the	category	in	the	
same sense and to the same degree. A similar remark can be made for 
nonmembers. In other words, instantiation does not come in degrees 
(Murphy, 2002, p. 15).
Thus, the classical theory of concepts is an extension of the received view, 
provided that psychological concepts are on a par with philosophical cat-
egories.
 The classical theory of concepts was abandoned some time ago. The 
beginning of its demise is usually attributed to the work of Rosch and 
her associates, in particular to Rosch and Mervis’s (1975) seminal paper 
“Family Resemblance: Studies in the Internal Structure of Categories.” 
The vast body of evidence that was collected since then entails the follow-
ing counterclaims to the classical theory: 
•	 There	are	objects	and	there	are	concepts,	such	that	the	former	are	
borderline instances of the latter.
•	 At	 least	 for	 some	 concepts,	 there	 are	 typical	 and	 atypical	 instances	
thereof; moreover, typicality comes in degrees.
•	 The	formal	properties	of	the	structures	we	build	out	of	concepts	are	ir-
regular and do not conform to the standard view on instantiation—for 
instance, the relation of subsumption between concepts are not transitive 
(Murphy, 2002, pp. 19–24).
 Let me add a few more words on the last, rather surprising finding re-
ported in Hampton (1982), which presents the results of two experiments 
that demonstrate that people categorize everyday objects in a different 
way than that envisaged by the classical theory. In the first experiment, a 
group of twenty students was challenged with a number of “category judg-
ments” of the form “An x is a y” (for example, “A bird is an animal”). The 
category judgments were built out of one general term, furniture; five less 
general terms: bed, chair, lamp, shelf, and case; and eighty specific terms, 
such that each of the five intermediate terms was related to sixteen more 
specific ones as their superordinate. The students were asked to rate the 
truth of those judgments on the same seven-point scale. It turned out that 
they evaluated around 22 percent of the trios of judgments—x is y, y is z, 
and x is z—in such a way that judgments x is y and y is z were evaluated 
as true, but x is z was found to be false. Below are some examples of such 
nontransitive trios:
•	 A	sedan	chair	is	a	chair.	A	chair	is	a	furniture	(piece).	A	sedan	chair	is	
not a furniture (piece).
•	 A	car	headlight	is	a	lamp.	A	lamp	is	a	furniture	(piece).	A	car	headlight	
is not a furniture (piece).
•	 A	hammock	is	a	bed.	A	bed	is	a	furniture	(piece).	A	hammock	is	not a 
furniture (piece).
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Further developments in experimental psychology gave rise to a number 
of competing theories of concepts, which may be roughly classified into 
three kinds: prototype theories; exemplar theories; and knowledge theories, or 
“theory” theories (Murphy, 2002, pp. 41–65).
 The differences between them notwithstanding, all these accounts of 
concepts share the basic tenets of the modern critique of the classical the-
ory. They reject the received view on instantiation if we interpret this rela-
tion as that between particular objects and concepts. Consequently, we 
need a new account of instantiation, provided that we want to employ in 
philosophy or elsewhere the tools that are fine-tuned with our conceptual 
apparatus. Obviously, different theories of concepts may lead to different 
views on instantiation, although the latter need not follow the former in 
every detail. For the purpose of this paper, I tested out the theory pro-
pounded by Barsalou (1993). In contradistinction to other approaches, 
Barsalou attempts to develop a kind of common conceptual language 
in which different theories of concepts may be rendered, rather than a 
yet-another model of concepts. Apparently, he seems to believe that the 
similarities among these accounts are more substantial than what meets 
the eye, arguing that despite all their differences, there exists a distinct 
abstract structure in which they can be expressed and whose capabilities 
are commensurable to the complexity of human knowledge (pp. 98–99). 
This lingua franca to speak about human concepts hinges on the notion 
of frame.
Frames for Concepts
A frame is a data structure composed of four types of elements: attributes; 
attributes’ values; structural invariants among attributes; and constraints 
on attributes’ values.3 The singular function of frames is to define or char-
acterize concepts. Consider, for example, the concept of watch as (par-
tially) described by the frame depicted in figure 1. The frame represents 
this concept by means of three attributes: movement mechanism, display, 
and case. The movement mechanism represents the physical principle of 
the watch’s operation, and our frame assigns it two values: mechanical 
and electronic. The display attribute characterizes the way in which nor-
mal watches provide time. The third attribute, case, represents the kind 
of substance the case is made of. The frame in question also contains 
a structural invariant, which is represented by the solid line tagged “con-
tains.” The role of this invariant is to integrate the case attribute with the 
movement mechanism. Finally, the frame also contains a value constraint—
indicated by the untagged dotted line at bottom left—to the effect that 
mechanical movement usually simultaneously occurs with the analog dis-
play. This last element of the frame is distinctive of Barsalou’s account, as 
this constraint does not mean that each mechanical watch has an analog 
display, but only that many of them do. In general, the notions of struc-
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tural invariant and value constraint cannot be interpreted in terms of the 
universal quantifier.
 Given the context of the present research, three distinctive features 
of Barsalou’s frames need to be highlighted: extendibility, flexibility, and 
ungroundedness. Let me start with extendibility. Since frames represent 
concepts, and both attributes and their values are concepts, there may 
exist, therefore, frames that represent other frames’ attributes and their 
values. For example, the attribute “companion” in the frame “vacation” 
may be represented by another frame in which it has its own attributes—
for example, age, relation, preferred activities, and so on. Moreover, a 
structural invariant within one frame can be extended in another frame; 
there are frames for structural invariants and value constraints. Barsalou 
(1993) provides us with the example of the “parthood relation,” which is 
a structural invariant in a number of frames. Following Winston, Chafin, 
and Herrmann (1987), he claims that parthood can be represented by a 
frame with four attributes: functionality, separability, homeomeronymy, 
and spatiotemporal extent. The other feature of Barsalou’s (1993) con-
ception is the flexibility of concepts:
Consider the word “newspaper” and note which of its features come to 
mind. Now consider the word “newspaper” in the context of building 
a fire. Whereas the feature flammable probably didn’t come to mind 
when you consider “newspaper” in isolation, it probably did when you 
considered it in the context of building a fire. Many researchers have 
implemented such manipulations in experiments and observed large 
effects on verification time. (p. 31)
Figure 1. A frame for the concept watch.
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Generally speaking, the flexibility of a concept consists in the variability 
of its content and structure with respect to different individuals who en-
tertain the concept and with respect to different occasions (contexts) in 
which it is employed. I propound that one may capture this phenomenon 
by means of what I call the “main frame and its variants.” According to the 
explanations given in Barsalou (1992, pp. 33–34), we store in our long-
term memory a sort of maximal frame for each concept—the main frame. 
This frame is constituted by the most comprehensive set of attributes for 
the concept.4 Barsalou (1993) reports the results of an experiment that 
supports the claim that the content of the main frame tends to be highly 
stable for individuals over extended periods of time. The main frame is 
accessed on different occasions by means of various subsets of this set, and 
each such subset may be represented by a frame. Barsalou holds that each 
such subset may give rise to a new concept and its frame, which I call a 
“variant” of the main frame. For instance, if we make a (grossly oversimpli-
fied) assumption to the effect that the frame in figure 1 is the main frame 
for the concept of watch, then the frames in figures 2 and 3 may be found 
among its variants. On the other hand, if you believe that the movement 
mechanism is an indispensable part of any watch, then the frame in figure 
4 does not belong to the set of frames that characterize this concept.
 Therefore, a concept may be associated with a number of frames due 
to its flexibility, which reflects the multifarious contexts in which it is em-
ployed. If one construes frames in terms of graphs or some other set- 
theoretical constructs, one may then introduce the notion of frame inclu-
sion. A frame f1 will be said to include a frame f2 if
•	 every	attribute	of	f2 is an attribute of f1;
•	 every	value	(of	an	attribute)	of	f2 is a value (of the same attribute) of f1;
•	 every	structural	invariant	of	f2 is a structural invariant of f1; and
•	 every	value	constraint	of	f2 is a value constraint of f1.
Then the frame in figure 1 includes the frames in figures 2–4, but the 
frame in figure 2 does not include the frame in figure 3, and vice versa. In 
general, a main frame includes each of its variants.
 A set of frames, including their variants and extensions, may give rise 
to a more complex structure, a system of frames, whose role is to represent a 
body of human knowledge. Barsalou (1992) repeatedly claims that within 
any such system, each concept is represented by, at most, one frame—“the 
one-entity one-frame principle,” which is to be interpreted here as the 
claim that each concept has exactly one main frame (and possibly numer-
ous variants thereof). The last characteristic aspect of frames concerns 
their ungroundedness:
Human conceptual knowledge appears to be frames all the way down. 
Frames are composed of attributes, structural invariants, and con-
Figure 2. A variant of the main frame for the concept watch.
Figure 3. Another variant of the main frame for the concept watch.
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Figure 4. A frame outside the concept watch.
straints, which in turn are represented by frames themselves. . . . For 
any attribute, structural invariant, or constraint, people can always 
construct further attributes, structural invariants, and constraints that 
capture variability across instances. . . . What was once a simple, uni-
tary primitive becomes analyzed and elaborated, such that it becomes 
a complex concept. For any representational content . . . people can 
always note a new source of variability across instances, and add further 
frame structure to capture it. . . . As a result, primitives that serve as 
simple, elementary building blocks no longer exist. Note that this is 
not an ontological claim about the structure of the physical world but 
is instead a psychological conjecture about how people represent it. 
(pp. 40–42)
 Consider one of Barsalou and Hale’s (1991) examples of how such 
analysis may begin: “People’s knowledge of house contains an attribute 
for ‘location.’ In turn, an attribute of a house’s location is its convenience. 
In turn, an attribute of convenience (for a house’s location) is its ‘prox-
imity to employment.’ In turn, an attribute of proximity to employment 
is ‘driving duration.’ In turn, an attribute of driving duration is ‘traffic 
conditions’” (p. 133). Each frame component may have a probabilistic 
nature so we may assign it a certain weight (a real number from the range 
[0, 1]), which represents its relevance for a given frame, because some 
concepts may require such probabilistic frames. Unfortunately, Barsalou 
did not provide a more rigorous description of frames, although some 
preliminary attempts to formalize them were undertaken—for example, 
Petersen (2007) and Urbaniak (2010). 
 new perspective on instantiation/garbacz 457
A Frame-based Perspective on Instantiation
What are the implications of the theory of frames for the notion of instan-
tiation? First, the relation between a single particular object and an ab-
stract class or concept is not as simple as the set-theoretical membership. 
Given the context of the frame theory, it is construed here as a compound 
that might be “disassembled” into two components: the relation between 
a single object and a single frame; and the relation between a single frame 
and a set of frames. Thus, when a particular object instantiates an abstract 
class or concept, this means that it falls under a frame, and that this frame 
belongs to a set of frames that represents this class or concept.
 The first of these relations does not relate particular objects with “flat” 
sets, but it relates them with complex systems or structures, which can be 
approximated as directed acyclic graphs (Petersen, 2007). This implies 
that an object x falls under a frame f when: for each attribute a of frame f, x 
has a property that is a value of a (within f  ); and if f has a value constraint 
c that relates values v1 and v2, then x has v1 if and only if x has v2. The 
second relation amounts to the set-theoretical membership—that is, ∈— 
between a frame and a set of frames. (Note that the concatenation of 
these two relations implies that the relation of instantiation is systemati-
cally ambiguous; it may happen that two objects falling under one con-
cept have no properties in common because they fall under two frames 
whose list of attributes are disjoint. In other words, that x1 instantiates 
class/concept c may mean something different than that x2 instantiates 
class/concept c.)
 Second, it follows from this definition that if one frame includes anoth-
er, then any object that instantiates the former frame instantiates also the 
latter. In particular, if an object instantiates the main frame for a concept, 
then it instantiates each frame for this concept but not vice versa. 
 Third, any component of a frame may be extended in its own frames 
so that each frame is involved in a system of frames. In principle, this ex-
tendibility of the frames’ components may have its impact on the relation 
of instantiation—or, more precisely, on its first subrelation. Thus, one may 
modify its definition as follows. An object x falls under a frame f when: for 
each attribute a of frame f, x falls under a frame f’  that characterizes a value 
of a (within f  ); and if f has a value constraint c that relates values v1 and v2, 
then x falls under a frame f1 for v1 if and only if x falls under a frame f2 for v2. 
 However, this change does not blend well with the aforementioned prin-
ciple of Barsalou’s theory that “human conceptual knowledge appears to 
be frames all the way down” (1992, p. 40). Having both of them, we would 
get a kind of vicious regressus in infinitum: x falls under f only if x falls un-
der frame f1 that characterizes one of f ’s attributes’ values only if x falls 
under frame f2 that characterizes one of f1’s attributes’ values only if . . . In 
order to stop this regress, one needs either to reject the principle in ques-
tion, admitting that some components are not further characterized 
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by frames, or to admit that in (at least) some cases, the fact that an object 
exhibits a value (from a certain frame) does not amount to this object’s 
falling under another frame.
 Fourth, even if we focus only on the deterministic (that is, nonprobabi-
listic) frames, the relation of instantiation need not have to be semantically 
crisp and may allow for fuzziness and different grades of typicality. Suppose 
that there are three individuals, x, y, and z, and three frames, f1, f2, f3, for 
concept c, such that f1 includes f2 and f3. If x falls under frame f1, y falls un-
der frame f2, z falls under frame f3, but neither y nor z falls under f1, then 
one can say that x is a more typical instance of c than y and z, or that the 
degree of x’s instantiating c is greater than the degree for y or z. Moreover, 
although both y and z are instances of c, their membership is somehow dif-
ferent because they fall under different frames for c, so the fact that y is an 
instance of c means something different than the fact that z is an instance of c.
 In addition, the theory of frames defines a new construal of the sub-
sumption relation. Suppose that there are two categories, c1 and c2, each 
defined by a respective set of frames, and we want to find out whether one 
subsumes the other. Instead of the extensional definition offered by the 
received view, we may now say that category c1 subsumes category c2 if for 
frame f2 for c2 there exists a frame f1 for c1, such that f2 includes f1. Then, 
given the above definition of instantiation, it follows that each object that 
falls under c2 also falls under c1, but it does not follow that if each object 
that falls under c2 also falls under c1, then c1 subsumes c2. As a result, this 
relation of subsumption need not be transitive—as Hampton’s (1982) ex-
periments attest. If the frames in question are sufficiently complex, it may 
happen that category c1 has a frame f1 that includes a frame f2 for category 
c2, category c2 has a frame f2’ (f2’ ≠ f2) that includes a frame f3 for category 
c2, but no frame for category c1 includes a frame for category c3.
5 Then, 
due to the definition of subsumption above, c2 subsumes c1, c3 subsumes c2, 
but c3 does not subsume c1.
 In a sense, this notion of subsumption is sensitive to a selection of 
frames, so perhaps we should think about it as relative to frames rather 
than as subsumption simpliciter. For example, the notion of chair subsumes 
the notion of sedan chair relative to the set of frames that focuses on hu-
man behavior, while the notion of furniture subsumes the notion of chair 
relative to the set of frames that also takes into account the spatial charac-
teristics and the aesthetic values of the artifacts we use.
 Finally, note that the received view on instantiation is, in fact, a border-
line case of this new perspective. If a concept has only one (deterministic) 
frame, then the relation of instantiation has the characteristics we know 
from the classical theory of concepts. Consider, for instance, a kind of 
degenerate frame for the notion of triangle that has only two attributes: 
being a polygon, having three sides. If this notion is defined only by this 
frame, then it is described by the classical theory of concepts:
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•	 Something	is	a	triangle	if	and	only	if	it	is	a	polygon	and	has	three	sides.
•	 Any	object	either	 is	a	 triangle	or	 is	not	and	 there	are	no	 in-between	
cases.
•	 Any	triangle	is	a	triangle	in	the	same	sense	and	to	the	same	degree;	in	
other words, “trianglehood” does not come in degrees.
In general, the set of necessary and sufficient conditions that defines a 
concept according to the classical theory can be translated to a frame that 
describes this concept.
 In what follows, I will attempt to show a possible application of this 
new perspective on instantiation in LIS. Namely, I will elaborate on the 
distinction between classification and categorization and the possibility of 
coordination thereof.
Classification versus Categorization
Jacob (2004) argues that classification and categorization are essentially 
disparate operations in LIS—although, because they share some common 
superficial features, they tend to be easily confused.6 To flesh out this sub-
stantial difference, he compares them with respect to the following six 
aspects:
•	 Process:	categorization is claimed to be unsystematic, creative, and respon-
sive to individual similarity assessments based on immediate context; 
classification is the systematic analysis of necessary and jointly sufficient 
characteristics that define each class.
•	 Boundaries:	 categorization draws fuzzy boundaries around categories; 
classification aims to establish fixed boundaries for classes.
•	 Membership	(that	is,	instantiation):	whether	an	object	belongs	to	a	cat-
egory is fuzzy and flexible; whether an object belongs to a class is fixed 
and rigorous.
•	 Criteria	of	membership:	 categorization is based on context-dependent 
criteria; classification is based on criteria that do not depend on con-
text.
•	 Typicality:	one	instance	of	a	category may be more or less typical than 
another instance; all instances of one class are on a par—they are typi-
cal to this class to the same degree.
•	 Structure:	categorization tends to produce clusters of entities rather than 
rigorous structures; classification is about hierarchical systems of classes 
whose structures are based on clear principles (pp. 527–531).
The last aspect summarizes, in a sense, the main differences between cate-
gorization and classification, so let me quote Jacob’s description in extenso:
A classification system is generally a hierarchical structure of well- 
defined, mutually exclusive, and nonoverlapping classes nested 
in a series of superordinate-subordinate or genus-species relation-
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ships. . . . For example, because an entity either is or is not a member 
of a particular class in a system of classification, it provides for determi-
nation of class membership as a relatively simple pattern-matching or 
pattern-completing activity. At a more complex level, the structure of 
the classification system establishes information-bearing relationships 
between classes: vertical relationships between superordinate and sub-
ordinate classes that are subject to the mechanism of inheritance . . .; 
and lateral relationships between coordinate classes that occur at the 
same level in the hierarchy and, when taken together, constitute the 
immediately superordinate class within which they are nested. . . . In 
contrast, the structure of a categorization system consists of variable 
clusters of entities that may or may not be organized in a hierarchical 
structure. Because categories are not constrained by a requirement 
for mutual exclusivity, membership in one category does not prohibit 
membership in any other category. . . . The potentially transitory and 
overlapping nature of categories provides that any relationships es-
tablished between categories are themselves mutable. (pp. 530–531)
 I will now investigate whether and to what extent the frame-based per-
spective on instantiation may bridge the gap between categorization and 
classification. Consider the following scenario. Suppose that we are given 
three categories, c1, c2, c3, within a context of categorization, and three 
classes, C1, C2, C3, within a context of classification. The three classes form 
a simple hierarchy: C1 and C2 partition C3; that is, each instance of C3 be-
longs either to C1 or C2, and C1 is disjoint from C2. The three categories ex-
hibit the average features of human concepts: fuzzy boundaries, typicality, 
flexibility, and so on; on the other hand, the three classes are, in fact, sets. 
Finally, there is an assumption that the set of categories and the system of 
classes are intended to grasp the same aspects of a given domain, so there 
is a need to coordinate them.
 The theory of frames may provide a framework in which these two dif-
ferent ways of representation can be harmonized so that a piece of in-
formation rendered in one of them can be translated to the other. To 
this end, for each class, we need to find its frame. Since classes resemble 
concepts as construed in the classical theory of concepts, each class might 
be described by exactly one frame—the class frame. Incidentally, note that 
since C3 subsumes C1 and C2, the frame for the former needs to be includ-
ed in the class frames for the latter classes. Similarly, for each category, we 
need to find its frames—category frames—which, if the category in question 
is indeed nonclassical, will be numerous. If the aforementioned assump-
tion is satisfied—that is, if the set of categories and the system of classes 
indeed represent the same aspects of one common domain—then we 
should be able to couple categories with classes in such a way that for each 
couple, the class frame (the frame for the class in the couple) is among 
the category frames (the frame for the category in the couple). 
 This condition guarantees a rather strong correspondence between 
the two means of representation. Having this kind of correspondence, we 
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would be in a position to detect inconsistency between any two instances 
of classification and categorization. Suppose that we coupled c1 and C1 (in 
the aforementioned sense) because it happens that the class frame for C1 
is the main frame for c1. Then the following two claims are inconsistent: x 
instantiates C1, and x does not instantiate c1. The reason is that if x instan-
tiates C1, then it also instantiates every frame included in the class frame 
for C1—in particular, all frames for c1. So, instantiating the class entails 
instantiating the category. On the other hand, x may not instantiate C1 but 
still does instantiate c1—possible when instantiating the latter category is 
less demanding than instantiating the former class. Therefore, although x 
exhibits some features required for its being a C1 and for that very reason is 
an instance of category c1, x does not exhibit all of them and for that very 
reason fails to instantiate class C1. 
 But the assumption on the correspondence between a system of classes 
and a set of categories may be satisfied also under a more relaxed condition. 
Suppose that we are able to couple classes with categories in the follow-
ing sense: for each couple, the class frame includes one of the category 
frames or a category frame includes the class frame. Then the relation-
ship between these two ways of representation appears to be much weaker 
than in the previous case, but they are not altogether incompatible.
 We could also handle the asymmetric cases of the classification/catego-
rization compatibility, where we are given either a system of classes or a 
system of categories. Suppose that we are confronted with a set of catego-
ries and, for one reason or another, we need to define the corresponding 
system of classes. Then, once we know the set of frames for a category, 
we will be in a position to pick up one of those frames—the main frame 
seeming to be the most suitable—to be the class frame for the class that 
corresponds to the category. Moreover, once we know a set of frames for 
each category, we can attempt to arrange those categories by the relation 
of subsumption. For example, the definition given above implies that if 
one frame includes another, then any category characterized by the latter 
frame subsumes a category characterized by the former. Thus, if a set of 
categories can be characterized by means of frames, we may establish a 
certain order or regularity between those categories. If our frame descrip-
tion is adequate, this pattern is discovered rather than stipulated. And 
the system of categories that emerges thereby is similar to classification 
systems though not equivalent because the relation of subsumption based 
on frames is of a rather peculiar type, as I argued earlier. On the other 
hand, if it were given a system of classes and we want to define the cor-
responding system of categories, then for each class, we can construe its 
class frame as the main frame for the corresponding category, which de-
limits the boundaries of the variety for the category in question. Namely, 
one can pick up a number of frames that are included in the main frame, 
and the set of all such frames, including the main one, will define the 
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corresponding category. Of course, this procedure will not define the 
unique category for a given class; in fact, it will provide a set of categories, 
where each category is defined by a set of frames that are included in the 
class frame. But this should not be surprising: one can render precise a 
fuzzy concept in a unique way, but usually one can make fuzzy a precise 
concept in more than one way.
 These thought experiments show, in my opinion, how the possibility of 
characterizing both classes and categories in terms of Barsalou’s frames 
may bridge the gap between classification and categorization. We may, 
thereby, coordinate the two ways of representation in a systematic and 
principled manner.
Conclusion
Although we often make claims to the effect that a certain particular ob-
ject exhibits some general characteristics or property, the actual content 
and implications of such claims sometimes remain conceptually opaque. 
The standard view on the relation of instantiation seems to be oversim-
plified to the point of being naïve, but neither philosophy nor psychol-
ogy have developed a single alternative theory to explain the sufficient 
number of phenomena in our use of concepts. This lack of insight is par-
ticularly troublesome in LIS, where classification and categorization are 
among the most elementary mental activities. Still, studying the existing 
theories of concepts may shed some light on the problems encountered 
therein. In this paper, I have tried to outline a new perspective on instan-
tiation inspired by the theory of frames developed by Barsalou. Although 
my outline of this perspective is intrinsically vague, it aims to exemplify 
how psychology may influence LIS. If this perspective is congruent with 
the current developments in psychology as I propound, its validity needs 
to be established by further, more empirical research.
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Notes
 1. The terminology in question may be confusing. For instance, in analytical philosophy, 
there is a tendency to speak about “properties” when referring to the “abstract” end of 
the instantation relation (see Oliver, 1996).
 2. Let me emphasize the fact that, strictly speaking, the formal semantics, which these tech-
nologies presuppose, implies the identification thesis that abstract categories are sets of par-
ticulars.
 3. As a matter of fact, Barsalou speaks about constraints in general and draws two orthogonal 
partitions thereby: attribute constraints versus value constraints; and contextual constraints 
versus optimizations. Therefore, my exposition simplifies Barsalou’s account to a certain 
degree. See also Garbacz (2013).
 4. Interestingly enough, quoting Goodman (1955), Barsalou maintains that the latter set 
can be infinite.
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 5. This possibility holds in the following example: frame f1 has three attributes, a1, a2, a3; 
frame f2 has two of them—say a1 and a2—but frame f2’ has a2 and a4; and frame f3 has a4. 
 6. For this reason, in this section I will differentiate between classes and categories.
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